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We show that equilibrium matching models imply that standard estimates of the matching
function elasticities are exposed to an endogeneity bias, which arises from the search
behavior of agents on either side of the market. We offer an estimation method which,
under certain structural assumptions about the process driving shocks to matching
eﬃciency, is immune from that bias. Application of our method to the estimation of a
basic version of the matching function using aggregate U.S. data from the Job Openings
and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS) suggests that the bias can be quantitatively important.
1. Introduction
The matching function is a modeling device designed to capture the process through which the supply and demand sides
are brought together in a frictional market. In a labor market context, the matching function maps the stock of job seekers
and the stock of vacant jobs at any given date into the ﬂow of jobs (or “matches” between vacant jobs and job seekers)
formed at that date (Pissarides, 2000). The matching function is the centerpiece of countless quantitative contributions to
the broad ﬁeld of macro-labor, some aiming to explain aggregate ﬂuctuations in hours, wages, and other macroeconomic
variables, others aiming to evaluate some policy, others still focusing on the allocation of the workforce between different
regions or industries. In most of those models, the matching function is a key parameter to assess constrained eﬃciency of
labor market equilibria — and therefore the scope for policy intervention.1
All such quantitative analysis has to rely on values of the matching function elasticities with respect to the numbers of
vacant jobs and job seekers. Those elasticities have been and continue to be the focus of a large body of empirical work,
which keeps expanding as better and more abundant data on job vacancies become available. In this paper, we argue that
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existing estimates of the matching function elasticities are exposed to an endogeneity bias arising from the search behavior
of agents on either side of the market. We offer an estimation method which, under certain assumptions, is immune from
that bias. We apply our method to the estimation of a very simple version of the matching function using aggregate U.S.
data from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).
Our results suggest that the bias is quantitatively important. For example, under the (common) assumption of constant
returns to scale, an OLS estimate of the aggregate matching function elasticity w.r.t. vacancies based on the JOLTS series
available at the time of writing is around 0.84. Our proposed estimate is around 0.7.2
From a theoretical standpoint, the source of bias that we highlight is straightforward. The matching function takes job
vacancies as one of its inputs. Vacancies are posted by proﬁt maximizing ﬁrms. The returns to posting a vacancy depend
on the eﬃciency of the matching process. Therefore, random shocks to matching eﬃciency affect the number of matches
formed both directly through the matching technology and indirectly through ﬁrms’ vacancy-posting behavior — very much
like total factor productivity (TFP) shocks affect aggregate production both directly and indirectly through the demand for
inputs. Hence, job vacancies are endogenous, and an estimation strategy consisting of, say, running OLS regressions of the
number of new matches on measures of the numbers of job seekers and job vacancies (a common strategy in the literature)
fails to account for that endogeneity.3 Yet, numbers based on such OLS estimates are routinely used to calibrate matching
models that typically feature a free entry condition (ﬁrms post job vacancies as long as the expected value of doing so is
positive), which explicitly makes vacancies a function of current matching eﬃciency.4
Perhaps surprisingly, the source of bias we identify in this paper has been largely ignored in the matching function
estimation literature, which has mainly been concerned with other potential sources of bias such as time aggregation or
imperfect input measurement, or with fundamental speciﬁcation issues (such as the relevance of stock-ﬂow matching).5
While we do recognize the importance of those various issues, we set them aside in this paper and focus on the source of
endogeneity described above.
Our estimation strategy consists of imposing an ARMA structure on matching eﬃciency, transforming the model using
pseudo differences to account for the autoregressive component of matching eﬃciency, and then estimating the transformed
equation by the generalized method of moments (GMM), using lags of the labor market tightness and/or the job ﬁnding rate
as instrumental variables. We implement this procedure for a wide range of ARMA processes and propose some explicit,
practical criteria for speciﬁcation selection.
Recent papers have used lags of the matching function’s inputs as instruments for their own current values. Depending
on the assumptions made about the process of matching eﬃciency shocks, some of the resulting estimates may coincide
with ours. However our focus is different from that of these papers as we highlight the role of the free entry condition, or
more generally of endogenous search behavior on one or both sides of the market, as potential sources of simultaneity.6 By
modeling the response of labor demand to matching eﬃciency shocks, we make the source of endogeneity explicit which
allows us to justify our instrumentation strategy within the structure of a general search and matching model.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we give a brief formal account of the endogeneity of vacancies using a
stripped-down, standard labor-matching model. In Section 3 we show how to consistently estimate the matching function
within the model of Section 2, imposing some structure on the matching eﬃciency shock. Section 4 describes the data.
Results are then presented in Section 5. In Section 6, we discuss the speciﬁcation of matching eﬃciency shocks, we relax
the standard assumption of constant returns to scale in the matching function and we investigate the role of aggregate
recessions in creating the endogeneity bias studied in this paper. Section 7 concludes.
2. Statement of the problem
2.1. A simple matching model
Although in principle the argument that we make in this paper applies to any matching model, in order to make our
point with minimal peripheral complication we shall focus on the simplest — and perhaps most widely considered — case of
an aggregate matching function m(·) that determines the number of matches formed between unemployed job seekers and
2 So the bias is positive in this case. While that particular OLS estimator is very commonly used in the literature, other estimators have also been
implemented, leading to different biases with different signs. We provide an extensive discussion of those different estimators below.
3 A similar problem would arise on the supply side if job seekers chose their search effort according to the eﬃciency of the matching process. Our
approach can be adapted to that case.
4 Most of those papers build upon the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model.
5 See the surveys by Petrongolo and Pissarides (2001) and Yashiv (2007). Burdett et al. (1994) offer a very clear and insightful discussion of time
aggregation in matching models. An empirical analysis of the time aggregation bias is conducted by Berman (1997). Anderson and Burgess (2000), Fahr and
Sunde (2005), Sunde (2007) and Jolivet (2009) quantify the bias arising from incomplete or imperfect input measurement. Gregg and Petrongolo (2005) and
Coles and Petrongolo (2008) offer an empirical investigation of the stock-ﬂow matching hypothesis, whereby the number of matches formed at any date is
jointly determined by the stock of job seekers and the inﬂow of new job vacancies into the search market.
6 Yashiv (2000) conducts a structural estimation of an equilibrium search and matching model. Sedlác˘ek (2011) analyzes the eﬃciency of the matching
function while accounting for unobserved job vacancies. Lastly, Barnichon and Figura (2011) study the effect of unemployment composition and dispersion
of labor market conditions on matching eﬃciency.
vacant jobs. Speciﬁcally, the number M of such matches formed in a given month is related to the number of unemployed
workers, U , and job vacancies, V , at the beginning of that month, in the following way:
M =m(U , V ) = AU δV η, (1)
where to further ﬁx ideas we follow the vast majority of empirical studies of the matching function in assuming a Cobb–
Douglas functional form.7 An important feature of (1) is the presence of a shifter, A, which has a random component
capturing random shocks to the matching technology. Those shocks parallel TFP shocks hitting the aggregate production
function: they can be interpreted as recruitment-sector speciﬁc productivity shocks caused, for example, by changes in
information and communication technologies affecting the way jobs are advertised or applied for, or by policy shocks
affecting the functioning of employment agencies, or by changes in the geographic mobility of the workforce. A is variously
referred to in the literature as a ‘reallocation shock’, a ‘measure of mismatch’ or one of ‘matching eﬃciency’. We will use
the latter option in this paper.
We further assume that the matching function exhibits Constant Returns to Scale (CRS) so that η = 1 − δ.8 In this case,
and with random matching — where all job seekers (vacant jobs) have equal sampling probability — the matching function
can be redeﬁned in terms of a job seeker’s job ﬁnding rate, F , as follows:
F = M
U
= AΘη, (2)
where Θ = V /U is labor market tightness. The job ﬁnding rate is the probability for any unemployed worker to ﬁnd a job
in the current month.9
The standard matching model (see e.g. Pissarides, 2000) is closed by assuming free entry and exit of ﬁrms in the search
market. While there are alternatives to the free entry assumption as a way to model labor demand (mostly involving some
adjustment cost of vacancies), we choose to focus on the free entry assumption as it is used in the overwhelming majority
of applications. Under free entry, ﬁrms post vacancies at a ﬂow cost of C per month until proﬁt opportunities from doing
so are exhausted. Labor demand is then determined by the free entry condition:
C = M
V
· Π, (3)
where Π is the present discounted value (PDV) of a ﬁlled and producing job in the typical ﬁrm. The interpretation of (3)
is that employers equate the marginal ﬂow cost of posting a vacancy (the constant C ) to the expected marginal return of
doing so, which equals the value of a ﬁlled job, Π , times the probability of ﬁlling the job, which from a ﬁrm’s perspective
equals M/V under random matching. Further note that, with CRS in matching, that probability is also a function of labor
market tightness only as M/V = F/Θ = AΘη−1. Substituting into the free entry condition (3) yields:
Θ1−η = Π A
C
. (4)
Given the number of unemployed job seekers U , ﬁrms post more vacancies if the PDV of employing a worker, Π , is higher,
or if the cost of posting a vacancy, C , is lower, or if the eﬃciency of the matching technology, A, is currently higher.
2.2. Endogeneity of labor market tightness
Taking logs in (2) and using lower case letters to denote logarithms, one obtains a convenient linear relationship between
f and θ :
f = ηθ + a. (5)
The focus of a large part of the empirical literature on the matching function — and that of this paper — is to obtain an
estimate of η. The common approach to this problem is to use measures of f and θ to estimate (5) by OLS. If free entry
holds, however, this will fail to produce a consistent estimate of η as (4) clearly implies that θ is correlated with a.10
Rewriting (4) in log terms yields:
7 Implicit in (1) is the additional assumption that unemployed workers all look for jobs with the same ﬁxed intensity. It is conceptually straightforward
to extend our point to the case of endogenous search intensity.
8 CRS is a theoretically desirable property for the aggregate matching function, and is indeed assumed in a vast majority of theoretical applications, as
well as in many empirical studies of the matching function. Yet an important body of empirical literature has been concerned with testing the assumption
of CRS. We brieﬂy investigate the consequences of relaxing the CRS assumption in Section 6.2.
9 Note that, in a discrete time model as the one considered in this paper, a constraint should be added to (2) to ensure that F is always less than one.
We follow conventional practice and ignore that constraint, assuming that A and Θ take on values that are consistent with F  1.
10 Notable exceptions to the OLS-in-levels approach are discussed below. For example, some authors have estimated a ﬁrst-differenced version of (5) by
OLS. As we show below, this FDOLS estimator is also exposed to a simultaneity bias.
θ = π − c + a
1− η , (6)
so that Cov(θ,a) = 0 in general. Intuitively, matching eﬃciency affects the job ﬁnding rate both directly by changing the
eﬃciency of the matching process, and indirectly by affecting the employers’ incentives to post vacant jobs. In spite of this
potential source of bias originating from the free entry condition, estimates of η based on OLS regressions of f on θ are
routinely used to calibrate matching models in which the free entry condition is assumed to hold.
As brieﬂy mentioned in the Introduction, many papers in the matching function estimation literature have addressed
potential simultaneity biases originating from measurement problems, as well as temporal aggregation biases. The problem
we address in this paper is clearly distinct and, in principle, cannot be solved by recourse to better or higher frequency
data. We now show how the endogeneity of θ can be overcome by imposing some structure on the process of the matching
eﬃciency shock.
3. The statistical model
3.1. Speciﬁcation
We propose to estimate the matching function using monthly time series observations of the job ﬁnding rate and labor
market tightness. Introducing a time index t , which becomes necessary at this juncture, we now decompose matching
eﬃciency at as follows: at = μ+τt +	t , where μ is a constant, τt is a seasonal dummy, and 	t is an unobserved component.
Rewriting Eq. (5), we obtain:
ft = μ + ηθt + τt + 	t . (7)
We further assume that the stochastic component of matching eﬃciency 	t follows an ARMA(p,q) process:
	t =
p∑

=1
ρ
	t−
 +
q∑

=1
α
ωt ⇔ P (L)	t = Q (L)ωt , (8)
where L is the lag operator, P (L) := 1−∑p
=1 ρ
L
 , Q (L) :=∑q
=1 α
L
 , and ωt is a serially uncorrelated disturbance.
3.2. Estimation
Applying the P (L) transform to (7), using (8) and re-arranging we obtain our main equation of interest for the estimation:
ft = ν +
p∑

=1
ρ
 ft−
 + ηθt −
p∑

=1
λ
θt−
 + P (L)τt + Q (L)ωt, (9)
with the common factor restriction:
ν =
(
1−
p∑

=1
ρ

)
μ and ∀
: λ
 = ηρ
. (10)
Estimation of this latter model can be based on the moment conditions E(ωtθt−
) = 0 and E(ωt ft−
) = 0 for all 
 q + 1.
While (θt , . . . , θt−min{p,q}) and, if q 1, ( ft−1, . . . , ft−min{p,q}) are endogenous in (9) as a consequence of free entry and the
persistence in the MA(q) component of 	t , Q (L)ωt , the structure imposed on the matching eﬃciency shock implies that
lags of θt (and/or ft ) beyond order q+1 are valid instruments for (θt , . . . , θt−min{p,q}) and ( ft−1, . . . , ft−min{p,q}). How strong
those instruments are will depend on the amount of persistence in the various components of θ — see Eq. (6) — and will
be assessed in the estimation.
The number of coeﬃcients to be estimated is p + 1 (the elasticity η and the p autoregressive coeﬃcients ρ
), so that
in principle only p + 1 moment conditions are needed for identiﬁcation.11 Because all lags of θt (and/or ft ) beyond order
q + 1 are valid instruments, the model is potentially overidentiﬁed.
Estimation of (7) ﬁnally requires a choice of values for (p,q), for which we adopt the following method. First, we
estimate (7) for all values of (p,q) in a grid, (p,q) ∈ {1, . . . , p¯} × {0, . . . , q¯}. Next, we select the highest value of p for which
we estimate statistically signiﬁcant autoregressive coeﬃcients (ρ
) up to order p. Finally, we select q by inspection of the
autocorrelogram of the residual Q (L)ωt from (7), estimated with the value of p previously selected. While informal, this
model selection procedure has the twofold advantage of being intuitive and straightforward to implement. Estimation of (7)
over a whole grid of values of (p,q) further allows us to assess the sensitivity of our estimate of η, the matching function
elasticity, to different assumptions about the persistence of the matching eﬃciency shock.
11 This count ignores the constant and the eleven month dummies, which are exogenous and included in the set of instruments.
Fig. 1. The (logarithm of) job ﬁnding rate and labor market tightness.
4. Data
We take our measures of job vacancies and matches formed from the Job Openings and Labor Turnover Survey (JOLTS).
JOLTS offers an aggregate time series of job openings and hires covering the U.S. non-farm sector starting December 2000
and ending in January 2012 at the time of writing. The ‘job openings’ variable (our measure of vacancies) is a count of all
positions that are open on the last business day of the month. The ‘hires’ variable (our measure of matches formed) counts
all additions to the payroll during the month.12 Finally, we use data on the number of unemployed aged 16 or over from
the Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS).
The left panel in Fig. 1 plots the non-seasonally adjusted time series of the job ﬁnding rate and labor market tightness,
both in log terms. The shaded areas indicate NBER-dated recessions. Apart from strong seasonality in both variables, the
graph suggests the presence of two breaks occurring around the middle of the two recessions covered by the data (Septem-
ber 2001 and, more markedly, October 2008 — both breaks are materialized on the ﬁgure by vertical solid lines). We discuss
the econometric contents of those breaks in some detail in Section 6.3. The right panel of Fig. 1 is a scatter plot of the job
ﬁnding rate against labor market tightness, both in log terms. Those two series co-vary very closely and the ﬁgure provides
prima facie evidence of an aﬃne relationship between ft and θt .
Dickey–Fuller tests do not reject the hypothesis of a unit root in both the job ﬁnding rate and labor market tightness.
The possibly nonstationary nature of ft and θt has led some authors to be concerned about the spuriousness of the corre-
lation between those two variables.13 As shown by Hsiao (1997), these concerns do not apply to our structural estimation,
based on GMM estimation of Eq. (9). More speciﬁcally, if ft and θt are nonstationary then OLS on (7) will yield a super-
consistent estimator of a cointegrating vector for ( ft, θt) (see Phillips and Durlauf, 1986, or Stock, 1987).14 However, what
we are after when estimating a matching function is not a cointegrating relation between ft and θt . Rather, we are seeking
to estimate the parameter of a structural relationship between ft and θt (the matching function). In other words, at the true
value of the matching function elasticity η, the residual 	t in (7) may not be stationary (our estimation results will indeed
show that we cannot reject nonstationarity). Hsiao (1997) shows that, in this context, GMM on (9) is consistent.
5. Estimation results
Our baseline speciﬁcation of the matching eﬃciency process assumes that 	t follows an ARMA(3,3) process. Our choice
of values for (p,q) was guided by the protocol described in Section 3: three is the highest autoregression order which we
ﬁnd to be statistically signiﬁcant in our data, and, given p = 3, inspection of the autocorrelogram of the residual from (9)
suggests an MA(3) structure. (We provide a more complete discussion of our choice of speciﬁcation in the next section.)
All estimations are run on non-seasonally adjusted data and include month dummies to capture seasonality. Prior seasonal
adjustment of the data would indeed create artiﬁcial serial correlation in all adjusted variables which would combine
itself with the endogeneity issue we are tackling here. The results are shown in Table 1. Columns 1–3 show estimates
obtained using benchmark speciﬁcations taken from the literature and are displayed for comparison purposes. Our preferred
estimator, accounting for endogeneity of labor market tightness and for the dynamics of eﬃciency shocks, is in columns 4
and 5 and places the elasticity at about 0.7 over the period under consideration. We now go over those results in detail.
12 See www.bls.gov/jlt/ for details.
13 The standard strategy is then to consider a ﬁrst-differenced version of Eq. (7) (see e.g. Yashiv, 2000).
14 A few further subtleties arise here. The statement that the OLS estimator of the regression coeﬃcient of a nonstationary variable yt on a nonstationary
vector xt is super-consistent for a cointegrating vector for (yt ,x′t ) is only true if the elements of xt are not themselves cointegrated. Strictly speaking, this
fails to hold in our case as the r.h.s. in (7) comprises θ and month dummies, which are stationary.
Table 1
Estimation results — baseline speciﬁcation.
1 2 3 4 5
OLS on (7) OLS on (7)
in FD
IV on (7)
in FD
GMM on (9)
(just identiﬁed)
GMM on (9)
(with overidentiﬁcation)
η 0.842
(0.013)
0.331
(0.070)
0.412
(0.107)
0.706
(0.095)
0.692
(0.062)
ρ1 – – – 0.517
(0.383)
0.461
(0.294)
ρ2 – – – −0.057
(0.270)
−0.038
(0.256)
ρ3 – – – 0.568
(0.290)
0.591
(0.270)
μ 0.042
(0.027)
– – 0.073
(0.474)
0.231
(1.025)
Obs. 133 132 129 129 129
Sargan test – – 3 : 14.62 : 0.002 – 1 : 0.056 : 0.813
(df : stat : p-value)
Month dummies included as regressors in all speciﬁcations. Instruments in column 3 are θt−
 for 
 = 2 to 
 = 5 (following Yashiv, 2000). Excluded
instruments in column 4 are θt−
 for 
 = q + 1 = 4 to 
 = q + p + 1 = 7. Instruments in column 5 are the same as in column 4, plus ft−
 for 
 = q+ 1 = 4.
Column 1 reports estimates obtained from OLS applied to Eq. (7). Our OLS point estimate of η, equal to 0.842, is on
the high side of estimates previously obtained by other authors based on JOLTS data, probably owing to the combined facts
that the JOLTS series now covers a longer period and has undergone a substantial revision in April 2011.15 Hall (2005)
ﬁnds an elasticity of 0.77 based on one year of JOLTS data (2002). Nagypál (2009) ﬁnds an elasticity of total hires with
respect to vacancies (not imposing CRS) of 0.668 on seasonally adjusted data and 0.531 on non-seasonally adjusted data.
(She rejects CRS in the latter case.) Nagypál’s sample stops in November 2004. Rogerson and Shimer (2010) ﬁnd an elasticity
of 0.42 (imposing CRS) on a sample going up to mid-2009, although they use MA-smoothed seasonally adjusted data in the
regression.
For column 2, we took ﬁrst differences (FD) of (7) and then ran OLS. Some authors have advocated estimating (7) in ﬁrst
differences, based on the worry that OLS estimates from the model in levels might be spurious owing to the nonstationary
nature of ft and θt . The OLS point estimate of η based on the ﬁrst-differenced version of (7), equal to 0.332, is indeed
less than half of that from the model in levels. While at ﬁrst blush this may reﬂect the spurious nature of the estimates in
levels, our interpretation is that the difference in estimates between columns 1 and 2 simply reﬂect different biases.16
We next implement the estimator used by Yashiv (2000) in an effort to “cater for nonstationarity [. . . ] and endogeneity”.
Yashiv’s estimator is again based on ﬁrst differences of (7): it consists of a 2SLS regression of  ft on θt , where θt is
instrumented by lags of θt of order 2 and above. Note that this estimator would coincide with our preferred estimator if
	t followed a random walk. The point estimate reported in column 3 is markedly higher than the OLS estimate from the
model in ﬁrst differences (0.412 vs. 0.332), although still about only half as high as the OLS estimate from the model in
levels (0.842). The discrepancy between the OLS and IV estimates on model (7) in FD should arouse suspicion as to the
consistency of OLS. Moreover, a Sargan test rejects the consistency of the set of instruments used in column 3.
Estimates using our proposed strategy are reported in columns 4 and 5. As per the estimation protocol laid out in
Section 3, Eq. (9) is estimated by two-step GMM with (θt , . . . , θt−3) and ( ft−1, . . . , ft−3) instrumented by lags of θt , impos-
ing the common factor restriction (10). Column 4 reports estimates from the just-identiﬁed case, where exactly p + 1
instruments are used to identify the p + 1 parameters (η,ρ1, . . . , ρp), which, in the (p,q) = (3,3) case, means using
(θt−4, . . . , θt−7) as instruments. The resulting point estimate of the matching function elasticity is reasonably precise, and
still markedly lower (0.706 vs 0.842) than the simple OLS estimate based on (5) in levels (column 1), indicating that the
simultaneity bias affecting OLS estimates has a positive sign. The autoregression coeﬃcients (ρ1, . . . , ρ3) are estimated with
somewhat disappointing precision, with only ρ3 being statistically signiﬁcant in column 4.
In order to gain some precision, we exploit the overidentiﬁed nature of the model. As noted in Section 3, all lags
of θt and ft beyond order q + 1 are valid instruments. Column 5 reports GMM estimates based on the same ‘minimal’
vector of instruments as in column 4, (θt−4, . . . , θt−7), supplemented by one additional instrument, ft−q−1.17 Point estimates
are virtually the same as in the just-identiﬁed case, and precision is slightly improved (ρ1 is now borderline statistically
signiﬁcant). Finally, consistency of our set of instruments is overwhelmingly accepted by a Sargan test (reported at the
bottom of column 5).
15 See www.bls.gov/jlt/ for details.
16 Asymptotically (and ignoring month dummies), the bias in column 1 converges to Cov(θ,a)/Var(θ), while the bias in column 2 converges to
Cov(θ,a)/Var(θ). Those expressions are impossible to sign in general as they depend on the dynamic structure of the matching eﬃciency shock
a and on its correlation with π and c (see Section 2).
17 Formally, estimation is based on the moment conditions E(ωtθt−
) = 0 for all 
 ∈ {q + 1, . . . ,q + p + 1} and E(ωt ft−q−1) = 0.
Table 2
Test of the common factor restriction (10).
θt [η] ft−1 [ρ1] ft−2 [ρ2] ft−3 [ρ3] θt−1 [ηρ1] θt−2 [ηρ2] θt−3 [ηρ3] Const.
0.685
(0.309)
0.386
(0.494)
0.048
(0.457)
0.593
(0.610)
−0.304
(0.270)
0.039
(0.326)
−0.439
(0.169)
−0.031
(0.201)
Sargan test: df = 1, stat = 1.505, p-value= 0.220
Wald test of common factor restriction: df = 3, stat = 0.03, p-value = 0.998
Month dummies included as regressors. Excluded instruments are θt−
 for 
 = q + 1 to q + 2p + 1 and θt−
 for 
 = q + 1.
Before we move on to a further assessment of the robustness of our results to alternative speciﬁcations, a few remarks
are in order. First, in principle we could have included many more lags of both θt and ft into the set of instruments.
However, because of the persistence in θt and the high correlation between ft and θt , those additional instruments would
not add much information and only contribute to bias estimates toward least squares. Application of (nonlinear) least
squares to (9) — still imposing the common factor restriction (10) — produces an estimate of η of 0.595, which is markedly
different from the value of 0.706 produced by GMM.18 However we have observed in experiments not reported here that
adding too many consecutive lags of θt and/or ft to the set of instruments brings the GMM estimate of η close to the NLS
value of 0.595.19
Second, based on the results shown in column 5, the hypothesis that
∑3

=1 ρ
 = 1 cannot be rejected, meaning that the
matching eﬃciency shock 	t may be nonstationary. This restriction can be imposed in (9), which leads to a similar equation
except that all the f ’s and θ ’s are taken in ﬁrst differences (and summations only go up to p − 1 lags). We estimate this
equation by two-step GMM, imposing the common factor restriction (10), and obtain an estimate of 0.652 for η (s.e. of
0.079), close to the one reported in columns 4 and 5.
Lastly, we should check the validity of the common factor restriction (10) and assess how much identiﬁcation power
it carries. To that end, we estimate (9) not imposing the restriction (10).20 Results for the (p,q) = (3,3) speciﬁcation are
reported in the top panel of Table 2. Point estimates thus obtained are very close to the corresponding estimates obtained
when (10) is imposed (see columns 4 and 5 in Table 3). While condition (10) does not drive the point estimates, it seems
however to play an important part in improving the precision of our estimates. The common factor restriction (10) can
further be tested using a Wald test, which is also reported in Table 2.21 It is overwhelmingly accepted.
6. Discussion
In Section 6.1 we discuss model selection based on the amount of persistence in matching eﬃciency 	t . In Section 6.2, we
attempt to relax the assumption of constant returns to scale in the matching function. Finally, in Section 6.3 we discuss the
nature of matching eﬃciency shocks and the possible use of an alternate estimator for η, namely OLS including structural
breaks in September 2001 and October 2008.
6.1. Model selection
Table 3 contains estimates of the model parameters under the maintained assumption that matching eﬃciency 	t follows
an ARMA(p,q) process for all values of (p,q) in the grid {1, . . . ,4} × {0, . . . ,6}. In each case, we expand the ‘minimal’ set
of instruments by adding ft−q−1 to provide some overidentiﬁcation, as we did in column 5 of Table 1. Table 3 suggests a
number of remarks.22
First, p = 3 is the highest AR order for which we were able to ﬁnd a statistically signiﬁcant coeﬃcient ρp . Table 3 only
reports estimation results for values of p up to p = 4 because of space constraints, but results for higher values of p are
available on request, and conﬁrm that the ρ
 ’s are never found to be statistically signiﬁcant beyond 
 = 3. Following our
model selection protocol (see Section 3), we choose p = 3 as our preferred speciﬁcation.
Second, while the point estimate of the matching function elasticity η is somewhat variable across speciﬁcations for low
values of p, it becomes reasonably stable (around 0.68) as soon as one allows for an autoregression order of at least three
(once again, estimates obtained under higher values of p are available on request). The estimate of η = 0.692 under our
preferred speciﬁcation of (p,q) = (3,3) seems ‘typical’ in the set of results displayed in Table 3.
18 Note that NLS applied to (9) can only be consistent for η if ωt is serially uncorrelated (q = 0) and uncorrelated with θt , which would be the case if, for
example, it took some time for employers to adjust vacancies, so that the free-entry condition (3) applied with a lag of at least one period.
19 For example, using 24 lags of both θt and ft produces an estimate of 0.62 for η. Other examples are available on request.
20 Note that, if (10) is not imposed, (9) becomes linear.
21 Because the CFR is a nonlinear restriction, the form under which we test it may matter for the Wald test (Gregory and Veall, 1986). Here we test
equality to zero of λ
 − ηρ
 . Using other forms (e.g. λ
/η − ρ
 = 0) leads to the same qualitative conclusion.
22 Note that in theory the point estimates may or may not be constant across (p,q) speciﬁcations. Indeed identiﬁcation, and thus the choice of the
instrument set, is driven by the structure imposed on the shock 	 . Values of (p,q) too far below the true ones will not produce estimates fully cleansed of
the endogeneity bias whereas values of (p,q) which are too high may lead to imprecise estimates, potentially getting closer to the NLS ones (cf. discussion
in Section 5).
Table 3
Different model speciﬁcations.
(p,q) μ η ρ1 ρ2 ρ3 ρ4 Sargan
(1,0) 0.069
(0.045)
0.866
(0.038)
0.706
(0.063)
0.082 : 0.774
(1,1) 2.987
(4.106)
2.986
(2.714)
0.982
(0.017)
0.037 : 0.848
(1,2) −1.215
(2.158)
0.338
(0.126)
0.993
(0.017)
4.622 : 0.032
(1,3) −0.763
(2.222)
0.529
(0.182)
0.993
(0.028)
0.042 : 0.839
(1,4) 0.326
(0.367)
1.107
(0.320)
0.926
(0.065)
0.349 : 0.554
(1,5) −0.030
(0.210)
0.695
(0.165)
1.031
(0.062)
0.459 : 0.498
(1,6) −0.682
(2.126)
0.558
(0.209)
0.993
(0.033)
1.133 : 0.287
(2,0) 0.074
(0.046)
0.870
(0.038)
0.712
(0.116)
−0.009
(0.144)
5.448 : 0.020
(2,1) 0.083
(0.043)
0.880
(0.034)
−0.442
(0.544)
1.009
(0.392)
5.756 : 0.016
(2,2) 1.671
(17.153)
0.493
(0.117)
0.678
(0.296)
0.325
(0.301)
5.353 : 0.021
(2,3) 0.115
(0.092)
0.910
(0.081)
1.026
(0.270)
−0.201
(0.298)
0.706 : 0.401
(2,4) 0.133
(0.076)
0.930
(0.066)
−0.455
(1.069)
1.191
(0.921)
0.154 : 0.695
(2,5) 0.025
(0.746)
0.612
(0.216)
1.018
(0.697)
−0.006
(0.716)
1.627 : 0.202
(2,6) 1.636
(46.735)
0.632
(0.160)
0.891
(0.661)
0.111
(0.676)
1.819 : 0.177
(3,0) 1.877
(29.130)
0.688
(0.046)
0.225
(0.127)
0.033
(0.136)
0.745
(0.147)
0.214 : 0.644
(3,1) 0.092
(0.299)
0.698
(0.049)
0.268
(0.198)
0.036
(0.156)
0.726
(0.141)
0.156 : 0.692
(3,2) −0.763
(2.335)
0.643
(0.059)
0.348
(0.208)
0.101
(0.233)
0.542
(0.161)
0.296 : 0.587
(3,3) 0.231
(1.025)
0.692
(0.062)
0.461
(0.294)
−0.038
(0.256)
0.591
(0.270)
0.056 : 0.813
(3,4) 0.096
(0.393)
0.684
(0.066)
0.525
(0.473)
−0.177
(0.478)
0.677
(0.285)
0.533 : 0.465
(3,5) 0.156
(0.748)
0.672
(0.067)
0.546
(0.410)
−0.274
(0.523)
0.746
(0.471)
0.004 : 0.950
(3,6) 0.191
(0.945)
0.666
(0.076)
0.580
(0.592)
−0.173
(0.557)
0.608
(0.433)
0.316 : 0.574
(4,0) 0.270
(1.023)
0.684
(0.039)
0.144
(0.198)
0.028
(0.134)
0.741
(0.141)
0.104
(0.225)
0.005 : 0.942
(4,1) 0.031
(0.173)
0.820
(0.152)
1.339
(0.660)
−0.244
(0.279)
0.669
(0.198)
−0.687
(0.428)
0.004 : 0.950
(4,2) 0.358
(1.254)
0.676
(0.036)
−1.073
(2.117)
0.475
(0.687)
0.604
(0.249)
1.023
(1.542)
0.001 : 0.980
(4,3) 1.398
(11.804)
0.668
(0.038)
−0.312
(1.165)
0.226
(0.476)
0.675
(0.276)
0.417
(0.698)
0.420 : 0.517
(4,4) 0.106
(0.284)
0.684
(0.043)
0.167
(1.051)
−0.033
(0.469)
0.655
(0.269)
0.245
(0.760)
0.545 : 0.461
(4,5) 0.098
(0.381)
0.671
(0.057)
0.422
(1.150)
−0.079
(0.632)
0.559
(0.404)
0.123
(0.860)
0.423 : 0.515
(4,6) 0.052
(0.607)
0.834
(0.414)
1.508
(0.824)
−0.683
(0.924)
0.906
(0.886)
−0.713
(0.650)
0.020 : 0.887
Month dummies included as regressors in all speciﬁcations. Instruments are θt−
 for 
 = q+ 1 to 
 = p + q+ 1 and ft−
 for 
 = q + 1. The ‘Sargan’ column
reports the Sargan test statistic and p-value.
Third, while estimates of the autoregressive coeﬃcients ρ
 are slightly less stable, the unit-root hypothesis
∑p

=1 ρ
 = 1
is never rejected based on a simple Student test (not reported here, available on request).23 In other words, matching
eﬃciency shocks are consistently found to be very persistent.
The next step is to select a value of q. Again following our proposed model selection protocol, we base our choice of
q = 3 on an inspection of the autocorrelograms of the residual of (9) for p = 3 and all values of q ∈ {0, . . . ,6}, shown in
23 One manifestation of this is the occasionally very poor precision with which the constant, μ, is estimated in the second column of Table 3. This is
because, as is apparent in (10), the estimating Eq. (9) only depends on ν = (1−∑p
=1 ρ
)μ, which is zero if ∑p
=1 ρ
 = 1.
Fig. 2. Autocorrelograms of estimated residuals from (7).
Fig. 2, where we look for ‘consistent’ speciﬁcations in the sense that the residual should exhibit no statistically signiﬁcant
autocorrelation beyond order q. It appears in Fig. 2 that only speciﬁcations with q 3 are consistent in that sense. Autocor-
relograms constructed using higher values of q suggest the same thing. For parsimony, we thus adopt the minimum value
of q in the consistent set, q = 3.
6.2. Non-constant returns to scale
Estimation has so far been conducted under the maintained assumption of a constant-return to scale (CRS) matching
function. While, as mentioned before, CRS is a theoretically appealing property for an aggregate matching function to have,
Table 4
Relaxing CRS.
1 2
OLS on (7) GMM on (12)
(with overidentiﬁcation)
η 0.164
(0.031)
0.736
(0.374)
δ˜ −1.118
(0.051)
0.117
(0.793)
ρ1 – 0.367
(0.264)
ρ2 – −0.010
(0.245)
ρ3 – 0.661
(0.248)
μ 9.685
(0.442)
−0.813
(6.743)
Sargan test – 1 : 0.775 : 0.379
(df : stat : p-value)
Month dummies included as regressors in all speciﬁcations. Instruments in column 2 are θt−

for 
 = q + 1 = 4 to 
 = q + p + 2 = 8, plus ft−
 for 
 = q + 1 = 4.
it is natural to investigate its empirical validity. The main problem one has to confront when relaxing the CRS assumption
is that it is diﬃcult to separately identify the elasticities of the matching function w.r.t. unemployment and vacancies, since
those two variables are highly correlated. This is especially true when using a relatively short sample such as JOLTS, which
only covers a dozen years.
Going back to the basic speciﬁcation of the matching function (1), we thus relax the assumption that η = 1 − δ. Taking
logs in (1), one obtains:
m = a + ηv + δu ⇔ f = a + ηθ + (δ + η − 1)u. (11)
Deﬁning δ˜ = δ + η − 1, simply testing δ˜ = 0 then provides a straightforward test of CRS.
To obtain consistent estimates of η and δ˜ under our speciﬁcation of the matching eﬃciency shock at , we proceed again
by applying the P (L) transform to (11):
ft =
(
1−
p∑

=1
ρ

)
μ +
p∑

=1
ρ
 ft−
 + η
(
θt −
p∑

=1
ρ
θt−

)
+ δ˜
(
ut −
p∑

=1
ρ
ut−

)
+ P (L)τt + Q (L)ωt−
. (12)
As in the CRS case, this can be estimated based on moment conditions of the form E(ωtθt−
) = 0, E(ωt ft−
) = 0, or
E(ωtut−
) = 0, for all 
  q + 1. Note that, compared to the CRS case, we now have one extra parameter to estimate
(namely, δ˜), and therefore require one extra moment condition for identiﬁcation.
Results obtained under the speciﬁcation of 	t following an ARMA(3,3) are reported in Table 4, which also shows OLS
estimates of η and δ˜ for comparison. Focusing on GMM estimates (column 2), we see that, as expected, a substantial amount
of precision is lost by relaxing CRS (δ˜, in particular, is very imprecisely estimated). However, three conclusions can be drawn
from the results in Table 4. First, at the low level of precision at which δ˜ is estimated, CRS cannot be rejected. Second, the
point estimates of η and the ρ
 ’s obtained without assuming CRS are very close indeed to our benchmark results (obtained
under the CRS assumption) shown in Table 1. Third, OLS estimates suggest a very low elasticity of the matching function
w.r.t. vacancies (η = 0.164) and a negative elasticity w.r.t. unemployment (δ = −0.282), which does not seem credible.
6.3. Structural breaks
As we discussed in Section 4, inspection of the raw series of ft and θt plotted in Fig. 1 suggests the presence of two
breaks occurring around September 2001 and, more markedly, October 2008. This observation in turn prompts the following
possible interpretation about the nature of matching eﬃciency shocks: one could think of 	t as resulting from the combi-
nation of rare, large, persistent shocks (the breaks observed in Fig. 1), and smaller, higher-frequency shocks.24 Under that
interpretation, one can further argue that occurrences of the big, low-frequency shocks are (approximately) observed in the
data: they coincide with the breaks that one can locate by simply eye-balling the data as we did in Section 4. Assuming that
those large shocks are permanent shocks, one can then control for their occurrences by simply adding post-break dummies
in the right-hand side of our equation of interest (7).25
24 We are grateful to Gianluca Violante for suggesting this interpretation, and indeed prompting the discussion in this section.
25 A peripheral, yet important question when one tries to explicitly capture the time variation in matching eﬃciency is that of the speciﬁcation of the
time trend. We use post-break dummies in this section because it is consistent (in the sense of being a special case of) our preferred ARMA speciﬁcation.
Table 5
OLS with structural breaks.
Imposing CRS Not imposing CRS
1 2 3 4 5 6
OLS OLS with struct. breaks GMM OLS OLS with struct. breaks GMM
η 0.842
(0.013)
0.583
(0.023)
0.692
(0.062)
0.164
(0.031)
0.215
(0.042)
0.736
(0.374)
δ˜ – – – −1.118
(0.051)
−0.942
(0.111)
0.117
(0.793)
Month dummies included as regressors in all speciﬁcations. Structural breaks placed in September 2001 and October 2008. GMM with CRS uses instruments
as indicated in Table 1, column 5. GMM without CRS uses instruments as indicated in Table 4.
We interpreted the discrepancy between the OLS and GMM estimates of the matching function elasticity reported in
Table 1 as a consequence of the fact that the job ﬁnding rate ft and labor market tightness θt are simultaneously affected
by the matching eﬃciency shock. A natural question to ask is whether that simultaneity bias is still present when one
controls for ‘observed’ large shocks in the way just described. Again, under the interpretation of shocks outlined above, one
might think that the response of labor market tightness to high-frequency (small) matching eﬃciency shocks is negligible
compared to its response to low-frequency, large shocks.
The left panel in Table 5 (columns 1–3) shows estimates of η obtained under the assumption of a CRS matching function
from simple OLS (column 1), OLS including indicators of structural breaks in September 2001 and October 2008 (column 2),
and from our proposed GMM estimator (column 3; columns 1 and 3 are taken up from Table 1). The right panel in Ta-
ble 5 (columns 4–6) repeats the same comparison without imposing CRS. Estimates of η and δ˜ are reported in that case
(columns 4 and 6 are taken up from Table 4).
Clearly, the inclusion of those structural breaks in the set of regressors has a large impact on the OLS estimate of η.
First, looking at the right panel of Table 5, it appears that, if one does not impose CRS, the only credible estimates in the
set reported are the ones obtained from GMM, as both OLS estimators predict a negative elasticity of the matching function
w.r.t. unemployment. As discussed in the previous section, GMM seems robust to relaxing the CRS assumption.
Next focusing on the (perhaps more standard) CRS case, we see that the inclusion of structural breaks as regressors
brings the OLS estimator slightly closer to, although now markedly below, our GMM estimate. Focusing on point estimates,
OLS with breaks produces an estimate of 0.583 for η, while GMM produces 0.692. Whether that difference is quantitatively
important or not is open to question — the answer probably varies between applications. Yet the fact that we ﬁnd such a
sizeable difference based on our JOLTS sample, which only has 133 monthly observations and straddles the single deepest
recession since World War Two (a shock of unusually large magnitude), leads us to conclude that the idea that the endo-
geneity of labor market tightness in matching function estimation is mostly driven by low-frequency, large and persistent
shocks that are observable, seems somewhat fragile.
Whether that idea is true or not, however, we want to advocate our GMM estimator and model selection protocol as
a systematic and robust way of addressing the endogeneity of θt in matching function estimation: not only is it robust to
relaxing the assumption of constant returns to scale, but it also obviates the need to ‘detect’ structural breaks by eye-balling
the data prior to estimation.
7. Conclusion
This paper begins by pointing out a simple implication of equilibrium matching models: the search behavior of ﬁrms
and/or job seekers implies that labor market tightness and the job ﬁnding rate are simultaneously determined as functions
of the unobserved eﬃciency of the matching process. As a consequence, the standard practice of regressing the job ﬁnding
rate on a measure of labor market tightness using, e.g., OLS, is exposed to a simultaneity bias. Imposing some structure on
the process followed by matching eﬃciency allows us to offer a consistent estimator of the matching function elasticity.
Application of our method to the estimation of a basic version of the matching function using JOLTS data suggests that the
bias has potentially important quantitative consequences.
In order to make our point with minimal peripheral complication, we have focused on a very basic version of the
equilibrium matching model, and deliberately abstracted from a number of important problems analyzed elsewhere in the
literature (such as time aggregation, imperfect input measurement or stock-ﬂow matching). Further work is needed to
examine how those sources of bias interact with the ‘structural’ problem of endogeneity of labor market tightness that we
emphasize in this paper.
Yet, obviously, other options exist: for example, S¸ahin et al. (2012) use a quartic trend instead of post-break dummies and ﬁnd an elasticity of η = 0.654,
very close to our own GMM estimate, on a JOLTS sample that stops in December 2010. Using polynomial trends on our extended data set produces similar,
although somewhat unstable results: under CRS, point estimates for η using OLS with a polynomial trend start at 0.741 with a linear trend and decrease
steadily as the order of the polynomial trend is increased (down to 0.695 for a quadratic trend, 0.65 for a trend of order 6, and 0.53 for order 10. . . ).
Relaxing the CRS assumption, estimates become very unstable, with the elasticity w.r.t. unemployment generally estimated a negative number. Details are
available on request.
Another question is that of the practical quantitative importance of the structural bias studied in this paper, which can
be measured by the extent to which it affects the quantitative predictions of various prominent equilibrium search and
matching models. For instance the Mortensen and Pissarides (1994) model has been used extensively to predict the effects
of labor market policy instruments such as ﬁring costs, hiring subsidies, taxes or minimum wages. These predictions usually
follow from calibrations based on estimates of the matching elasticity that potentially suffer from the endogeneity bias we
studied in this paper. It would be interesting to see how sensitive those predictions are to variations in the value of the
matching function elasticity.
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